

Bonds of Affection: Italian Americans' Assistance for Italy

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In early November 2002, the Washington-based National Italian American Foundation established a special fund of \$25,000 to help the victims of an earthquake that had hit San Giuliano di Puglia just a few days earlier¹. Such a prompt response to a faraway calamity from the most influential Italian-American ethnic organization in the United States was hardly surprising. Actually, Italian immigrants to the United States and their offspring have long been concerned with the lot of the people in their ancestral country. This attitude has not been confined to a reasonable interest in the fate of their relatives and friends who have remained in their native land but has extended to the welfare of the Italians in general. For instance, as early as the turn of the twentieth century, when an earthquake struck Calabria and an eruption of the Vesuvio left many people homeless in the area of Naples, members of Italian-American communities almost immediately laid aside their regional rivalries and joined forces to initiate fundraisings for the victims of these natural disasters («Il Popolo», 23 Sept. 1905; 14 Apr. 1906).

In the interwar years, the spread of nationalistic feelings in the wake of Benito Mussolini's rise to power added a political dimension to this involvement. In the mid 1920s, many Italian Americans contributed money in the effort to help the Fascist regime pay off Italy's war debt with the United States and purchased Italian state bonds to back up the lira («Italian Review», 5 Dec. 1925; «L'Eco del Rhode Island», 10 Dec. 1925; «La Gazzetta di Syracuse», 5 Mar. 1926). In major Little Italies such drives raised sums that ranged from \$22,835 in Chicago to over \$100,000 in New York City («L'Italia», 17 Jan. 1926; «Il Progresso Italo-Americano», 11 Apr. 1926). Although

these figures were next to a drop in the sea for the needs of the Italian government, they were also a major commitment for primarily working-class communities most of whose members lived below the poverty line.

In addition, at the urging of Generoso Pope's «Il Progresso Italo-Americano», the most influential Italian-language daily in the United States, and the Federation of Italian World War Veterans, many Italian Americans donated their savings to the Italian Red Cross during the Italo-Ethiopian conflict in the winter of 1935-1936. They also gave their money to the Ente Opere Assistenziali, a Rome-based and government-controlled welfare agency, after Italy entered World War II. These Fascist-inspired campaigns aimed at securing funds for the *Duce's* military machinery under the facade of humanitarian aid for either injured Italian soldiers and their families or the country's needy civilians (Ventresco, 1980, pp. 18-19). Anti-Fascist organizations repeatedly denounced the real purpose of these financial contributions. But such revelations could not prevent the Italian Red Cross from raising roughly \$700,000 in New York City, about \$65,000 in Philadelphia, nearly \$40,000 in San Francisco, and more than \$37,000 in Providence (Luconi, 2000, p. 87). Similarly, in 1941, Italian Americans collected more than \$200,000 for the Ente Opere Assistenziali in New York City and roughly \$30,000 in Boston, Chicago, Philadelphia, Providence, and San Francisco. The Italian World War Veterans sent additional \$296,777. The 1941 donations were not as large as their 1936 counterparts since US Secretary of State Cordell Hull had the former campaign discontinued a few months after its inception because of the close ties between the Fascist Party and the Ente Opere Assistenziali («Providence Journal», 11 May 1941)². As even anti-Fascists acknowledged, after facing ethnic bigotry and discrimination on the grounds that they belonged to an allegedly inferior people, many Italian Americans cherished their Italian identity, basked in the glory of the achievements of the Fascist regime, and enjoyed the improvement of their status in the eyes of the Wasp establishment in the United States after the *Duce* had apparently turned their native country into a great power (Ware, 1940, p. 63; Salvemini, 1960, p. 110).

However, anti-Fascist groups, too, engaged in humanitarian activities to benefit Italians. In mid 1941, for instance, the Mazzini Society as well as the Italian-language locals of the International Ladies Garment Workers Union (ILGWU) and the Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America (ACWA) launched a major nationwide drive to collect clothing, tobacco products, radio sets, and other supplies for the Italian POWs in British detention camps. In the view of these organizations, Italian soldiers were «not Fascists but victims of fascism» (Mercuri, 1990, pp. 181-82).

Italy's declaration of war on the United States on 11 December 1941 forced Mussolini's Italian-American fellow travelers to disavow fascism and

to purchase US war bonds in what a federal official of Italian descent called a surreptitious attempt to «purchase personal security»³. Yet even the military conflict between Rome and Washington failed to make Italian Americans loose their ties to the their ancestral land. As sociologist Joseph S. Roucek (1945, p. 468) pointed out, «most American Italians looked for a mirage: American victory without Italian defeat».

Indeed, as soon as Italy's armistice with the United States in September 1943 and her subsequent declaration of war on Germany legitimized again the pro-Italian lobbying campaigns of the American people of Italian descent in the eyes of the US public opinion, Italian Americans mobilized once more to secure benefits for the population of their native country. In particular, they rallied behind resolutions that Congressman Vito Marcantonio introduced twice – on 5 May 1944 and on 9 February 1945 – in the fruitless effort to have the US government recognize Italy as an ally. Besides placing Italy in a better position at the peace conference, such a status would have enabled her to qualify for US assistance under the Lend-Lease Act⁴. Notwithstanding Marcantonio's notorious radicalism, the consensus for his resolution was almost unanimous among Italian Americans and ranged from labor leaders such as Philip De Luca of the ACWA and Joseph Salerno of the Congress of Industrial Organization (CIO) to former Fascist sympathizers like Judge Eugene V. Alessandrini of Philadelphia's Court of Common Pleas and New York State's Industrial Commissioner Edward Corsi (US House of Representatives, 1945).

The hardships of the people in the southern regions that the US and British armies had occupied were among Italian Americans' paramount concerns after the Allies landed in Sicily and started to move northward along the peninsula. Washington and London had initially agreed that relief for the Italian population would be limited only to the level sufficient to prevent the spread of diseases and social unrest. But, as the tides of refugees from Nazi-controlled areas further exacerbated the humanitarian emergency in the South, Italian-American organizations started to pressure the US government into sending additional aid to the areas under American and British control («Unione», 20, 27 Aug. 1943).

However, the response of Washington was rather slow and it took months for Italian Americans' demands to be satisfied even in part. It was only in February 1944 that Joseph E. Davis, the chairperson of the President's War Relief Control Board, authorized the establishment of a temporary Board of Trustees to study the matter of American aid to the Italian population («Unione», 25 Feb. 1944). The trustees were Major General John H. Hilldring of the civil affairs division of the army, conductor Arturo Toscanini, pedagogue Angelo Patri, actor Don Ameche, and Myron C. Taylor, a former executive of the US Steel Corporation and President Franklin D. Roosevelt's

personal envoy to Pope Pius XII. Taylor also served as chairperson. Two months later, on Roosevelt's request, the temporary board turned into a corporation, called American Relief for Italy (ARI), with Taylor as president. This organization aimed at coordinating and providing relief shipments for the Italian people. It was certified by the President's War Relief Control Board and, thus, qualified for federal funds. The ARI, Inc. eventually became a sort of clearing house for all activities carried out by other groups or organizations that were interested in assistance for war-stricken Italians⁵.

A political goal underlay the creation of this agency as well. A number of Italian-American *prominenti* sat on its Board of Directors. Besides Judge Juvenal Marchisio of New York City's Domestic Relations Court, who replaced Taylor as president after the liberation of Rome on 4 June 1944, they included union leader Luigi Antonini of the Italian-American Labor Council, Generoso Pope, and Felix Forte, the Supreme Venerable of the Order Sons of Italy in America (OSIA), the largest Italian-American ethnic association nationwide (Cavaioli, 1983, pp. 144-46). As such, the ARI, Inc. also sought to settle disputes over the management of US aid to the Italians among Roosevelt's supporters of Italian ancestry and to prevent this issue from contributing to jeopardize the president's political following among Italian-American voters in the forthcoming race for the White House (Miller, 1986, p. 105).

The US government let the Vatican exert a major influence in these humanitarian efforts. Not only was Taylor Roosevelt's envoy to the pope. He also retained the chairmanship of the Board of Directors of the ARI, Inc. even after Marchisio took over as president of the organization. Moreover the Vatican secured three out of ten seats on the governing board of the Ente Nazionale per la Distribuzione dei Soccorsi in Italia, the distribution agency through which the ARI operated in the peninsula. The three representatives of the Vatican were Monsignors Ferdinando Baldelli and Walter S. Carroll, of the Vatican Secretariat of State, as well as Carlo Pacelli, a lawyer and the pope's nephew⁶. Unlike the powerless and discredited Reign of the South or the quarrelsome anti-Fascist parties, the Catholic Church seemed a more reliable counterpart. In Roosevelt's opinion, after the fall of the Fascist regime, the Vatican was the only effective political power in Italy. Moreover, in the eyes of Washington, the prominence of the Vatican in the relief distribution would strengthen the role of the Church as a social pacifier in postwar Italy that the Allies themselves cherished (Aga Rossi, 1976, p. 169; Giovagnoli, 1982, p. 236).

Italian Americans cooperated with the ARI primarily by collecting clothing for the Italian people («Unione», 8 Apr. 1944; *Ordine Nuovo*, 27 May, 17 June, 24 Aug. 1944; «La Gazzetta del Massachusetts», 19 Aug. 1944). By mid August 1944, for instance, the Rhode Island lodges of the OSIA had gathered more than fourteen tons («Providence Evening Bulletin», 11 Oct. 1944).

Philadelphia's Local 122 of the ACWA, in which members of Italian descent were a large majority, initiated a similar drive⁷. Likewise, Chicago's Italian Welfare Committee amassed 33 tons of clothing (Sorrentino, 1995, p. 9).

But Italian Americans also came out against the extended delays in the delivery of relief. By the end of February 1946, the ARI had distributed 10 million pounds of new and used clothing, over 1.3 million pounds of shoes, nearly 9 million pounds of milk, almost 4 million pounds of food, and more than 200 thousand pounds of medicines and surgical equipment. Yet the inception of these shipments was long deferred. Actually, it was only in June 1944 that the War Relief Control Board approved the initial \$1.6 million budget of the ARI («Unione», 16 June 1944) and delivery operations did not actually start before October of that year when the War Department announced that clothing and pharmaceutical products would be sent to Italy as space was available in US army vessels. In late September, Taylor himself had resented the continuous postponements of shipments⁸.

In the Spring of 1944, disappointment with the handling of relief for Italy by Taylor's organization characterized many Italian Americans. Italian exiles such as Don Luigi Sturzo (1976, pp. 265-66) voiced their sense of frustration with federal authorities, too. Banker Luigi Criscuolo, the chairman of the conservative Council of Americans of Italian Origin, even called for Taylor's resignation («New York Times», 3 May 1944). Pope's «Il Progresso Italo-Americano» was among the most vocal critics of the US humanitarian policy in Italy. In early May, the newspaper accused the War Relief Control Board of «rank prejudice and injustice against the suffering Italian people» («Il Progresso Italo-Americano», 3 May 1944). While the activities of the ARI were not in high gear yet, Justice Ferdinand Pecora of New York Supreme Court launched a parallel campaign to get funds for assistance for the Italians. He planned to raise \$20 million to relieve hardships in the areas of Italy controlled by the Allies through the American Committee for Italian Democracy, an association established following Mussolini's downfall on 25 July 1943, to prevent communism from filling the vacuum originated by the demise of the Fascist regime. But the War Relief Control Board failed to give this organization the necessary permission on the grounds that the primary aim of the Committee was political rather than humanitarian («New York Times», 5 May 1944). To «Il Progresso Italo-Americano» (3 May 1944), the failure to authorize such a drive was outrageous. An editorial accused the Board of victimizing «the destitute and the ailing among the freed Italian folks» and indignantly asked how a federal agency could arrogate to itself «the right to deny free American citizens an opportunity to engage in humanitarian endeavors, in activities which can only serve our country in its crucial hours and save thousands of lives of men, women, and children in liberated Italy». On 9

September 1944, «Il Progresso Italo-Americano» complained again that the policy of Washington was unable to cope with the needs of the Italian population.

Nineteen forty-four was an electoral year. Roosevelt's aides thought that the endorsement of «Il Progresso Italo-Americano» was key to secure the Italian-American vote (Gerson, 1964, p. 127). Thus, Pope tried to exploit his alleged political clout in order to force the US government to make more effective efforts to help the Italian people. After all, earlier that year, when Pope called for the restoration of civilian mail service between the United States and the Italian provinces occupied by the Allied troops so that Italian Americans could communicate with their relatives and friends in their ancestral country («Il Progresso Italo-Americano», 8 Jan. 1944), the Roosevelt administration satisfied his demand in a few weeks⁹.

Other Italian-American leaders followed suit. Not only did they join Pope in the campaign for the resumption of mail interchange («New York Times», 11 Feb. 1944). They also resorted to Pope's same strategy and played upon Roosevelt's need for the Italian-American vote in the attempt to obtain a more liberal relief policy for Italy from the US government. For instance, that was the case of George Baldanzi, the executive vice president of the CIO-affiliated Textile Workers Union of America and himself an officer of the ARI from which he would soon resign in protest over Pope's appointment as treasurer of the organization. While he was in Italy with an American delegation that planned to help reorganize a free labor movement after the fall of fascism, Baldanzi met Taylor in late August and mentioned the likely loss of the support of the Italian-American electorate for Roosevelt in case the president continued to fail to take the appropriate measures in order to relieve the hardships of the Italian people. According to Baldanzi, as Taylor rushed to report to Roosevelt himself, at least 65 percent of Italian-American voters would refuse to cast their ballots for the Democratic Party in the forthcoming race for the White House unless the president made up his mind to supply the Italian provinces occupied by the US and British armies with significant amounts of humanitarian and economic aid¹⁰.

Italian Americans' political pressures apparently paid off in the end. On 26 September 1944, President Roosevelt and British Premier Winston Churchill issued the so-called «Hyde Park Declaration» that, among other provisions, allocated \$50 million for Italy under an aid program of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA) (Kogan, 1956, pp. 80-89; Miller, 1986, pp. 112-13).

Yet Italian Americans were skeptical about the effectiveness of that measure and its implementation. Playing once more on politics as concerns with Communist subversion had become «the Americans' *idée fixe* in their Italian

strategy» since April 1944 (Di Nolfo, 1978, p. 87), Pope warned the Roosevelt administration against a likely Communist takeover in Italy unless the country obtained more economic and humanitarian help from the United States¹¹. According to *La Parola* (13 Oct. 1944), a Socialist-oriented weekly published in New York, the UNRRA funds would not provide milk for Italian children and were not large enough to stimulate Italy's postwar economic reconstruction. Similarly, *Ordine Nuovo* (21 Oct. 1944), the weekly mouthpiece of the Pennsylvania Grand Lodge of the OSIA, argued that \$50 million were too little to help 20 million destitute since New York State had spent as much as \$30 million per month to take care of 1.5 million unemployed during the Depression of the 1930s. In the opinion of the OSIA, a more effective alternative and integration to the US policy for Italy was authorizing Italian Americans to directly supply relief for their fellow ethnics in their ancestral country.

The matter of relief for Italy intertwined with much broader issues such as US electoral politics and the postwar settlement in the country, on which both the numerous Italian-American organizations and the Allies themselves disagreed. On the one hand, the attempt of the US government to enhance its plans for assistance to the Italian people and the economic rehabilitation of the country in the Fall of 1944 followed almost overnight a bid for the Italian-American vote by Roosevelt's 1944 Republican opponent in the race for the White House, New York State's Governor Thomas E. Dewey. The GOP candidate argued in his Columbus Day proclamation that «Americans cannot and will not stand and watch Italy suffer. What we have thus far done is little indeed compared to what we must do. The forces of freedom there are entitled to our aid» (State of New York, 1946, p. 308). In the wake of Dewey's statement, the Roosevelt administration announced the forthcoming shipment of more than 3 million pounds of clothing, shoes, and other goods to Italy («Il Popolo Italiano», 12 Oct. 1944). The US government also promised to establish a fund with the dollar equivalent of the Italian liras issued by the Allies since the invasion of the peninsula that would be made available to the Italian government to purchase necessary supplies for its people in the United States («Il Popolo Italiano», 19 Oct. 1944). Finally, in the last few weeks before the presidential election, Roosevelt authorized individuals to send relief packages to relatives and friends in Italy and instructed Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson to increase the bread ration in liberated Italy to 300 grams a day per person («Il Progresso Italo-Americano», 19 Nov. 1944).

On the other hand, although a number of lay and confessional organizations ended up operating in Italy (Rubboli, 2003), the significant role of the Vatican in the ARI, Inc. was controversial for fears that humanitarian aid could be used as a means of political corruption or to discriminate against non-Catholics. As Vanni Montana (1975, p. 276) – a leader of both the Mazzini

Society and the ILGWU – would later point out, the distribution of American relief for the Italian destitute turned out to be a godsend for the establishment of a Catholic political machinery that was enabled to match its Socialist and Communist counterpart, but excluded lay forces. His retrospective remarks echoed the worries of many non-Catholic Italian Americans in 1944 and 1945. Indeed, a New York City-based National Evangelical Committee for Relief in Italy was even founded to help Italian Protestants¹².

After the end of World War II, the attention of Italian Americans focused on the peace treaty between the United States and Italy and on the fruitless effort to prevent Congress from ratifying what they thought as being a most punitive settlement with their ancestral country (Venturini, 1985, pp. 50-57). However, campaigns to send humanitarian aid to the Italian people continued both under the auspices of the ARI and through the direct drives by Italian-American ethnic associations (*Ordine Nuovo*, 10 Nov. 1945, 10 Aug. 1946). In 1946, for instance, Chicago's Italian Welfare Council sent clothing and powdered milk (Sorrentino, 1995, p. 9). One year later, the OSIA launched a major fundraising for the construction of an orphanage in Cassino, a symbolic location as «the most blood-soaked soil in Italy». Started «in the name of patriotism, charity and human solidarity» after a visit of the OSIA leader to Italy the previous year, the campaign met with a number of difficulties and the orphanage was inaugurated only in 1956 (Biagi, 1961, pp. 39-50). However, with per-capita income roughly halved from 1938 to 1945 and per-capita caloric consumption cut by nearly one third in the same period, Italy continued to depend on American resources to finance the purchase of food, fuel, and other necessary supplies even in the postwar years (Zamagni, 1990, pp. 406-7).

In the first half of 1946, the UNRRA program supplied Italy with food for \$165 million, clothing for \$51 million, and pharmaceutical products for \$12 million¹³. To Italian-American organizations, however, this humanitarian assistance met the needs of their ancestral country only in part. In their view, not only Italy's food ration ranked among the lowest as for the nations that received aid from the United Nations, but relief shipments were also irregular. In addition, the UNRRA program was to be terminated by 1947. Therefore, while the ARI, Inc. began to make appeals for help outside Italian-American communities (Marchisio, 1947), ethnic associations such as the Italian Welfare Council of Chicago and the OSIA called for a US loan to the Italian government not only to help the population but also for the economic rehabilitation of the country. Resolutions to that effect were passed at a number of meetings and promptly forwarded to Congressmen in Washington¹⁴.

The outcome of these lobbying efforts, however, was rather modest. When Italian Prime Minister Alcide De Gasperi traveled to the United States in January 1947, he managed to secure a \$100 million loan from the Export-Import

Bank as opposed to the over \$900 million that the Italian ambassador in Washington, Alberto Tarchiani, had initially requested (Perrone, 1995, p. 57). Italy subsequently obtained \$227 million in interim aid from the US government in the first three months of the following year. These latter funds were eventually appropriated in the face of the opposition of isolationists such as Republican Senator Robert Taft, against whose policy Italian Americans had voiced their criticism. For example, the Italian-language weekly *L'Araldo* (14 Nov. 1947) – published in Cleveland, in Taft's home state – argued that the senator's stand would push Italy into the hands of Bolsheviks.

As the argument of *L'Araldo* contributes to reveal, the emergence of the Cold War provided Italian Americans with a powerful issue in their quest for an extension of US assistance to their ancestral country. While the philosophy underlying the Marshall Plan assumed that communism was a sort of social disease that thrived among the destitute, Italian Americans played upon the potential threat of a Communist takeover in Italy in order to win additional aid for their native nation. In particular, they resorted to this strategy in their campaign to have Italy included among the beneficiaries of the Marshall Plan. George J. Spatuzza, the supreme venerable of the OSIA, specifically instructed Leonard Pasqualicchio, the chief lobbyist of this organization in Washington, to point out that «the Marshall Plan will effectively combat the spread of communism» in order to pressure Congressmen into passing it and comprising Italy among its recipients. At the hearings of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Spatuzza himself stated that «the alternative to positive action of the United States in extending enough economic assistance [...] may easily spell political enslavement under totalitarian rule» in Italy¹⁵.

Other Italian-American organizations adopted the same tactic. When a delegation of Local 48 (Italian Cloak, Suit, and Shirt Makers) of the ILGWU met Assistant Secretary of State Robert A. Lovett in early April 1948 to plead for special funds for southern Italian regions within the Marshall Plan, they stressed that the allocation of that money would strengthen the democratic regime in the country (Montana, 1975, pp. 338-41). In the wake of the announcement of the Truman Doctrine, even Judge Marchisio exploited the red menace to corroborate his own call for the appropriation of emergency funds for Italy. «Without the economic aid of the United States», he argued, «Italy will experience the triumph of radical parties in the next elections. Relief should turn into a major loan of \$1 billion for the reconstruction to give her people bread, work, and confidence in American friendship» (*L'Araldo*, 9 May 1947).

Politics and Italian Americans' concerns for their fellow ethnics in their ancestral country deeply intertwined especially in 1948. As many members of the Little Italies joined a nationwide campaign to prevent the Popular Front from winning that year's parliamentary elections in Italy, remittances to rela-

tives in their native land usually included warnings against casting ballots for the Communist and Socialist candidates. According to the most conservative estimations, Italian Americans sent their kinsfolk and acquaintances in Italy at least one million letters opposing the Popular Front (Gotshal and Munson, 1948). Likewise, Italian Americans' personal donations of food, medicines, and other supplies for the Italian people were often included in the «Friendship Train», a project of conservative syndicate columnist Drew Pearson who devised a private and smaller-scale version of the Marshall Plan to curb communism in Italy by strengthening Italians' ties to the United States through the free distribution of consumer goods at train stations in different towns and villages (Miller, 1986, p. 242; Wall, 2000).

Only few Italian Americans, most notably Congressman Marcantonio (1956, pp. 251-58) and Michele Salerno, editor of the Communist mouthpiece «L'Unità del Popolo», took issue with their fellow ethnics' mass participation in the anti-Communist crusade of the Truman administration (Salerno, 2001, pp. 106-7), which aggressively intervened in Italian politics to avert a Communist victory in the 1948 elections (Colby, 1978, pp. 72-73; Miller, 1986, pp. 243-49). However, the enthusiastic adherence of most Italian Americans to the Cold-War strategy of the Truman administration in their ancestral country in 1948 does not mean that their sympathy with the Italian people for its postwar hardships was politically motivated.

Italian Americans' response to an analogous tactic of the Ford administration on the occasion of Italy's 1976 parliamentary elections offers a case in point. This year, too, the apprehension for a Communist success at the polls was widespread in Washington. Both the American ambassador in Rome, John Volpe, and the US Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, openly came out against the entry of the Communist Party into the Italian government (Bonsanti, 1975). Specifically, Kissinger threatened to have Italy expelled from NATO in case Communist ministers joined the Italian cabinet («New York Times», 12, 22 Mar. 1976; «Washington Post», 14 Apr. 1976).

Against this backdrop, former Texas Governor and US Secretary of Treasury John B. Connally intended «to involve 25 million Italian Americans in the effort to influence Italy's voting» through an organization called the Citizens Alliance for Mediterranean Freedom (Reston, 1989, p. 543)¹⁶. Yet, as he himself eventually admitted, his appeal fell on deaf ears («New York Times», 6, 14, 28 June 1976). However, although Italian Americans failed to antagonize the Communist Party in a replica of their 1948 campaign as Connally had expected, they aptly mobilized in relief activities for the victims of an earthquake that hit Friuli on the eve of the vote. They not only raised money for homeless people but also lobbied the Ford administration in a successful attempt to have the United States appropriate \$25 million in disaster relief («Sons of Italy Times»,

31 May, 7, 14, 28 June 1976; «Il Progresso Italo-Americano», 4, 5, 6, 11 June 1976; Ford, 1979, vol. 2, pp. 1523-24, 1769-970)¹⁷.

The Friuli earthquake and the Italian parliamentary elections were almost concurrent. Italian Americans' overlook for political events as opposed to their sympathy with the victims of this natural catastrophe shows that their humanitarian concerns outlived their political worries and involvement. Once again, as the aftermath of Italy's 1941 declaration of war on the United States had already revealed, solidarity networks between the Little Italies and the ancestral country of their members were much stronger than political connections.

Notes

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«NIAF Establishes Relief Fund for Victims' Families of Earthquake in Southern Italy», 4 Nov. 2002 <www.niaf.org/news/pr_earthquake_fund.asp> (accessed 25 Nov. 2002).
- ² «Funds for Fascism», Italian News Service Press Release, 11 Mar. 1941, Franklin D. Roosevelt Papers, Official File 233a, f. «Miscellaneous 1941», Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, NY; «Axis Voices among the Foreign-Born», *Propaganda Analysis*, 4, 9 (Aug. 1941), pp. 3-4; J. H. Lee, report for the Federal Bureau of Investigation, 28 June 1941, Department of State, Record Group 59, 865.20211 / Federation of Italian World War Veterans / 6, series Lm 142, reel 39, National Archives II, College Park, MD.
- ³ Renzo Sereno to Eugene Katz, Washington, DC, 26 Aug. 1942, Philleo Nash Papers, b. 23, f. «Italian-American memoranda», Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, MO.
- ⁴ Vito Marcantonio Papers, b. 51, ff. «International Relations: Italy, Recognition of – 1944», «International Relations: Italy, Recognition of – 1945, 1-3», New York Public Library, New York; John E. Fogarty Papers, Special Folders, b. 4, f. 28, Phillips Memorial Library, Providence College, Providence.
- ⁵ Charles P. Taft to Edwin M. Watson, Washington, DC, 31 Mar. 1944, Myron C. Taylor Papers, b. 13, Roosevelt Library; Myron C. Taylor to William D. Hassett, New York, 22 Mar. 1949, Harry S. Truman Papers, Official File 477, Truman Library; Juvenal Marchisio, «Extract of Open Letter Printed in the Press in Answer to Inquiries», typescript, n.d. [but 1944], Leonard Covello Papers, b. 82, f. 1, Balch Institute for Ethnic Studies, Philadelphia, PA.
- ⁶ *American Relief for Italy, Inc.* (New York, 1946), Truman Papers, Official File 477.
- ⁷ Minutes of the meetings of the Grand Council of the Grand Lodge, 13 Aug. 1944, OSIA, Papers of the Rhode Island Grand Lodge, b. 5, Immigration History Research Center, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis; membership meeting minutes, 20

- Mar., 16 Apr. 1944, Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America Papers, b. 63, f. «Local 122, Membership Meeting Minutes, 1940-1959», Temple University Urban Archives, Paley Library, Philadelphia.
- ⁸ Myron C. Taylor, memorandum, Rome, 29 Sept. 1944, Franklin D. Roosevelt Papers, President's Secretary's File 72, Roosevelt Library.
- ⁹ Memorandum on Pope, 1944, Roosevelt Papers, President's Personal File 4617.
- ¹⁰ Myron C. Taylor to Franklin D. Roosevelt, Rome, 1 Sept. 1944, Roosevelt Papers, President's Secretary's File 72.
- ¹¹ Gene Rea to Generoso Pope, forwarded to Franklin D. Roosevelt, New York, 7 Oct. 1944, Roosevelt Papers, President's Secretary File 45.
- ¹² Office of Strategic Services, Foreign Nationalities Branch, Report no. 228, Washington, DC, 16 Jan. 1945, Records of the Intelligence Division of the War Department General and Special Staffs, Record Group 165, National Archives II.
- ¹³ Council for American-Italian Affairs, Report no. 7, 13 July 1946, Nash Papers, b. 48, f. «Italian-American affairs». For UNRRA in Italy, see also Woodbridge, 1950, vol. 2, pp. 257-94; vol. 3, pp. 470-73.
- ¹⁴ «Economic Conditions in Italy», *Trade with Italy*, 2, 2, Feb. 1947, pp. 15-17.
- ¹⁵ George J. Spatuzza to Leonard H. Pasqualicchio, Chicago, 30 Dec. 1947, George J. Spatuzza Papers, b. 5, f. 21, Immigration History Research Center; «Statement of George J. Spatuzza», 1 Feb. 1948, *ibidem*, b. 5, f. 19.
- ¹⁶ Undated Associated Press release on Connally, Charles McCall Files, b. 75, f. 48.76, Gerald R. Ford Library, Ann Arbor, MI.
- ¹⁷ Frank Annunzio to Charles Leppert, Jr., Washington, DC, 30 June 1976, Gerald R. Ford Papers, White House Congressional Mail Files, b. 29, f. 2, Ford Library.

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